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Summary
We present here a research plan leading to the specification
of a network front end (NFE) which will meet World Wide Military Command
and Control System (WWMCCS) needs through the 1980' s. We briefly review
the current state of the art as it affects NFE development, identify
some promising directions for research, describe tools for performing
the research, and present a detailed plan for conducting the research.
State of the Art
The NFE must be modular, efficient, and multi-level secure if
it is to meet WWMCCS needs. Three groups of systems are considered
relevant to NFE development:
existing network access systems,
secure systems, and
high-bandwidth communications systems.
Examination of these three groups reveals that there does not exist, nor
will there exist in the near future, a system which will meet WWMCCS
needs
.
Research Directions
We present some promising ideas for research which might lead
to solutions to NFE problems. Two alternative hardware architectures
are presented for solving the bandwidth problem. An alternative soft-
ware architecture, the Hub System, is presented which may solve the
problems of producing a modular, efficient, and multi-level secure
system.

Tools for Analysis and Design
Carrying out the research will require a number of basic aids
to system analysis and design. These aids include measurement tools and
modeling tools. We present a brief description of tools of these kinds
and how they are expected to fit into the overall research approach.
Research Plan
We present a research plan with four phases:
I. the preparation phase,
II. the research phase,
III. the prototype phase, and
IV. the specification phase.
The preparation phase will produce a set of technical constraints
for the design of the WWMCCS NFE and will select a set of design features
to be studied in the research phase. The selection will be performed
through mathematical modeling using the technical constraints. The
research phase will design and construct a Research NFE that will be
used for evaluating architectural concepts through an iterative process
of implementation, testing, and measurement. The prototype phase will
design and construct a Prototype NFE which will serve as the basis for
specifying the WWMCCS NFE. The specification phase will develop the
WWMCCS NFE specification.

State of the Art
In this section we discuss the state of the art in hardware
and software architecture as it affects the development of an NFE. We
establish a basis for the discussion of architectures in order to
facilitate the discussion of existing network access systems, secure
systems, and existing high-bandwidth communications systems. We evaluate
each of these systems with respect to their potential for use as the
NFE.
Basis for Discussion
As a basis for discussing existing and proposed architectures,
we present a set of system requirements, a set of architectural concepts,
and a reference system. The system requirements provide a basis for
evaluating an architecture's ability to perform adequately, both qualita-
tively and quantitatively. The architectural concepts provide a basis
for describing system structures. The reference system provides a basis
for comparing architectures.
System requirements . The system requirements presented here
are drawn from the CCTC-WAD Network Front End Development Plan [15].
They are to serve solely as a basis for evaluation of NFE architectures
and are not intended as a functional description of a production NFE.
The system requirements can be divided into two groups: system
characteristics and system functions.
System characteristics describe overall properties of a system.
These may be further divided into qualitative characteristics and quanti-
tative characteristics.

NFE:
The qualitative characteristics of the NFE are:
1. modular structure,
2. multi-level security, and
3. reliable operation.
The quantitative characteristics of the NFE are:
1. support of 250 terminals, and
2. maintenance of a large fraction of the theoretical
bandwidth on the host and network links.
System functions are the specific functions performed by the
1. communication with a host or hosts via a
host-to-front-end protocol,
2. communication with a network or networks via
the appropriate network protocols,
3. communication with terminals connected both directly
and via the telephone network, and
4. allowing the following interconnection routes:
a. terminal to host,
b. terminal to network via the virtual terminal
protocol appropriate to the network, and
c. programs in the host to the network via appropriate
network protocols.
Architectural concepts . The basic categories of concepts
applicable to NFE software architecture are:
1. module implementations,
2. module interconnection structures,
3. event notification mechanisms, and
4. device independence.
Of these, only module implementations and event notification mechanisms
are examined for the systems considered in this document.

Module implementation refers to the software structure of
modules, their place in the system, and the means whereby they are
invoked. The kinds of module implementation considered here are:
1. interrupt service routines,
2. procedures,
3. processes, and
4. isolated processes.
Interrupt service routines (ISR's) are software modules
Initiated by the hardware whenever certain events occur, such as I/O
completion on a particular device.
Procedures are subroutines called by other modules.
Processes are independently executing programs whose state can
be saved by an external agent at any time and restored at a later time
without interfering with the process's function. A process's address
space may or may not be isolated from the address space of other processes
Isolated processes are processes whose address spaces are
isolated from each other.
Module interconnection structures refers to the patterns of
interconnection between modules. Interconnection structures are
1. static or dynamic, and
2. multi- or single-level.
Static or dynamic interconnection structure describes whether
the interconnection structure can be changed without terminating the
execution of a module and restarting it.
Multi- or single-level interconnection structure describes
whether the depth of the connection structure can be greater than one.

Event notification mechanisms are the means whereby a module
is notified that an event relevant to it has occurred. Those considered
here are
1. blocking,
2. polling,
3. software interrupts, and
4. event queues.
Blocking is applicable only to modules which are processes.
The process's execution is suspended until the awaited event occurs.
Polling refers to the repeated testing by the module of a bit,
called an event flag, associated with the event. The event flag is set
by hardware or by another module.
Software interrupts associate a procedure within the module
with an event. When the event occurs, the procedure is called.
Event queues associate a queue with each module. When an
event occurs, a short message, called an event notice , is put in the
queue of the affected module. When a module is ready to process an
event, it attempts to get an event notice from its queue. If there is
an event notice in the queue, it is removed from the queue and processed.
If there is no event notice in the queue the module waits. This tech-
nique is usually used with modules implemented as processes which block
when their event queues are empty.
Device independence refers to the level of abstraction at
which I/O devices are addressed in the system. If devices are addressed
at a low level of abstraction, the device access methods will be device
dependent and thus heterogeneous. If devices are addressed at a high
level of abstraction, the access methods will be device independent and

thus homogeneous. Device independence is an important determinant of a
system's flexibility.
Reference system . For the purpose of comparing the existing
and proposed architectures that implement the NFE system functions, a
reference system is presented here.
Figure 1 is a block diagram of the NFE functions in their
interconnection as modules. The Host Link, Network Link, and Terminal
Driver modules interface the NFE to the host, network and terminals,
respectively. The Host-to-Front-End Protocol (HFP) module performs the
necessary translation between host and NFE representations of data and
control information. The Virtual Terminal module performs the necessary
translation between terminals and host or network representations of
data and control information. Similarly, the Network End-to-End module
translates between network and host or terminal representations of data
and control information.
Figure 2 shows the interconnection of NFE modules to form the
routes through the NFE. These routes are from terminal to host, from
terminal to network, and from host to network both directly and via high
level (e.g., virtual terminal) protocols.
In order to simplify the comparison of existing and proposed
NFE architectures, we single out from figure 2 the terminal to network
route. This terminal to network route provides a reference system for
our comparisons which is simple yet still entails all of the architectural
features of the systems to be discussed. This reference system route
with several channels through it is shown in figure 3.
Existing Network Access Systems
The performance of the existing network access systems has
never been measured scientifically. However, some characterization of
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performance is possible, based on experience, and is given for each of
the systems discussed.
ANTS I . ANTS I (ARPA Network Terminal System) was produced at
the University of Illinois in 1972 to provide virtual terminal (Telnet)
connections to the ARPA Network for directly connected and dial-up
terminals. ANTS I also provides remote job entry service to the UCLA
IBM 360/91 using a card reader and line printer.
The reference system (figure 3) is implemented in ANTS I as
shown in figure 4. The assignment of reference system functions to
ANTS I modules is as follows:
Terminal Driver and Virtual Terminal:
Terminal Input ISR (Interrupt Service Routine)
Terminal Output ISR
Terminal Output Procedure
Network End-to-End:
NCP Input Process
NCP Output Procedure
Network Link:
IMP Input ISR
IMP Output ISR
In the ANTS I system, all processing directly associated with
I/O devices, and even some network protocol processing, takes place in
ISR*s. Procedures are used to interface the ISR's to one another and to
the processes that perform the higher level functions. These procedures
activate the output ISR's when necessary by simulating hardware interrupts
in software.
Processes are employed wherever a function does not deal
directly with hardware. These processes are driven by event queues. A
process blocks whenever it attempts to remove data from an empty queue.
11
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ANTS I supported more than 20 terminals simultaneously with
remote job entry input and output. No degradation in performance was
noticeable, even under the highest load to which ANTS I was subjected.
The upper limit of ANTS I performance has never been determined.
ANTS I was not designed with security in mind. Furthermore, the com-
plexity of its architecture precludes its being made into a secure
system.
ANTS II . ANTS II [1] was produced at the University of
Illinois Center for Advanced Computation in 1974 to provide a wider
range of functions and a more flexible structure than ANTS I.
ANTS II implemented the reference system as shown in figure 5.
The assignment of reference system functions to ANTS II modules is
as follows:
Terminal Driver:
Terminal Output ISR
Terminal Input ISR
Terminal Procedure
Virtual Terminal:
Telnet Process
' Network End-to-End:
NCP Process
Network Link:
IMP Input ISR
IMP Output ISR
IMP Input Process
IMP Output Process
Functions in the ANTS II system are performed almost entirely
in processes which communicate with each other via event queues and
event notices. A minimum of processing is performed by ISR's, which
communicate with the processes either via the processes' event queues or
by blocking the processes.
13
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ANTS II was unable to support more than a few terminals without
running out of buffer space on a PDP-11 with 28K words of memory. ANTS II
was not designed with security in mind. Even though the ANTS II architec-
ture is simpler than that of ANTS I, it is not clear how ANTS II could
be made into a secure system.
ELF . The ELF systems were produced at the Speech Communications
Research Laboratory of the University of California at Santa Barbara.
ELF I was similar in design to ANTS I, and ELF II [8,9] was produced to
provide a wider range of functions and a more flexible structure. This
section discusses ELF II. ELF II was originally intended to support research
in packet speech transmission, but the design is general enough for its
use as a general purpose system for accessing networks.
ELF II implements the reference system as shown in figure 6. The
assignment of reference system functions to ELF II modules is as follows:
Terminal Driver:
Terminal Output ISR
Terminal Output Procedure
Terminal Input ISR
Terminal Input Procedure
Character IOX Process
Virtual Terminal:
Telnet Process
Network End-to-End:
NCP Process
Network Link:
IMP Input Process
IMP Output Process
Block IOX Process
IMP Input Procedure
IMP Input ISR
IMP Output Procedure
IMP Output ISR
15
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In addition, two modules perform a connective function:
EXEC Process (1 per channel)
Port IOX Process
Functions in the ELF II system which deal directly with I/O
hardware are performed by procedures and ISR's under the control of
dedicated IOX (I/O Auxiliary) processes. These modules communicate via
procedure calls and via event notices. All other functions are performed
by processes which communicate via event notices.
The performance of ELF I was similar to that of ANTS I, sup-
porting many terminals with no noticeable degradation of performance.
The performance of ELF II was significantly better than that
of ANTS II. On a PDP-11/45 with 64K words of memory, ELF II can support
32 terminals. However, analysis of its processor and memory utilization
indicates that it is unlikely that ELF II could meet the NFE requirements.
Neither ELF I nor ELF II was designed with security in mind.
As with ANTS I and ANTS II, it is uncertain whether or how either ELF I
or ELF II could be made into a secure system.
Network Unix . Network Unix [3,6] was produced at the University
of Illinois Center for Advanced Computation (CAC) in 1975 to provide a
small general purpose system with network access capability. Unix was
produced by Bell Telephone Laboratories as an operating system for the
larger models of the Digital Equipment Corporation PDP-11 series mini-
computers. CAC added ARPANET software and hardware facilities, including
NCP and TELNET.
The reference system is implemented in Network Unix as shown
in figure 7. The assignment of the reference system functions to Network
Unix modules is as follows:
17
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Terminal Driver:
Terminal Input ISR
Terminal Input Procedure
Terminal Output ISR
Terminal Output Procedure
Virtual Terminal:
Telnet Input Process (1 per channel)
Telnet Output Process (1 per channel)
Network End-to-End:
NCP Procedure
NCP Process
Network Link:
IMP Input Process
IMP Input ISR
IMP Output ISR
Functions in the Network Unix system which deal directly with
I/O hardware are performed by ISR's and procedures which communicate via
procedure calls. High-level functions such as protocol interpretation
are performed by processes. The processes communicate with the procedures
via procedure calls and blocking.
Network Unix performance noticeably degrades under loads of
between 10 and 20 terminals. Thus it cannot meet the NFE requirements.
Short of a complete redesign, the internal structure of Network Unix
precludes its being made into a secure system.
ENFE. The ENFE (Experimental Network Front End) [7,10] is
being produced by the University of Illinois Center for Advanced
Computation under its contract (DCA100-76-C-0088) with CCTC-WAD. It is
intended to serve as a front end between a WWMCCS H6000, the ARPANET,
and terminals. The ENFE will consist of Network Unix with the addition
of a Host-to-Front-End protocol implementation and a new inter-process
communication (IPC) mechanism.
19

The reference system will be implemented in the ENFE as shown
in figure 8. The difference between the reference system as implemented
in Network Unix and as implemented in the ENFE is that the two Telnet
processes required in Network Unix for each Telnet connection will be
combined into a single process in the ENFE for each Telnet connection.
This is because the new IPC mechanism permits a process to have multiple
incomplete I/O operations pending simultaneously.
The performance of the ENFE should be rather better than that
of Network Unix, upon which it is based. This expected improvement is
due to the reduction in the number of processes involved and to the use
of the faster PDP-11/70. The ENFE, being UNIX based, suffers the same
drawbacks vis-a-vis security as does Network Unix.
Secure Systems
The state of the art with respect to multi-level security as
implemented in computer systems is embryonic. Producing an NFE which
is securable and which meets the other NFE requirements will be a diffi-
cult task. Two relevant efforts are described below.
Secure Unix . The Unix operating system, which is the basis of
both Network Unix and the ENFE, currently runs on DEC PDP-11 systems.
Two separate efforts are under way to produce a multi-level secure
operating system whose interface is as nearly identical to that of Unix
as possible. Because these two efforts, one at UCLA [11,12] and the
other at the MITRE Corporation [13], use the same basic approach, they
will be discussed together.
The basic approach is to collect, into a "security kernel,"
all of the operating system functions that involve access to data by
processes. The security kernel is designed and implemented in such a
way that its correct operation with regard to multi-level security can
20
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be mathematically verified. In order to make the security kernel small
enough to make this verification possible, its functions include only
those which affect the security of data. Operating system functions
such as process scheduling are not included. Thus, in order to provide
all operating system functions, another "layer" of system is necessary
to implement the functions not implemented in the security kernel. This
layer contains the interface to user-level programs and the means to
translate user-level program requests into requests to the security
kernel when required.
When Secure Unix is operational, the ENFE software is to be
merged with it to produce a Secure ENFE. Because of the added layer of
system software, we can only expect that the performance of the Secure
Unix NFE will be below that of the ENFE.
SFEP . The Secure Front End Processor [4,14] is a secure
communications processor being developed by the Honeywell Corporation.
Its hardware base is a Honeywell Level 6 minicomputer with the addition
of a Security Protection Module (SPM). The SPM controls access to
program and data in units called segments. The reading, writing, and
execution of each segment is separately controllable. Because a large
number of segments is addressable at any instant, very fine control
over data and program access is possible. The SPM also implements a
concept called "rings of privilege," which defines a set of domains in
which software modules execute. Modules executing in privileged rings
may be allowed to access segments which modules executing in less privi-
leged rings cannot access. Invocation of privileged modules by less
privileged modules is tightly controlled. I/O hardware is also under
the control of the SPM. These features provide substantial support for
the implementation of a secure system.
22

At this writing, it appears that Honeywell is planning to
adapt Secure Unix as the software for the SFEP. Due to the additional
support provided by the hardware, we can expect that the performance of
an SFEP with a software system based upon the Secure Unix NFE will be
above that of the PDP-11 based Secure Unix NFE.
High-Bandwidth Communications Systems
The Collins C-System . The C-System Model 8562 was produced by
the Collins Radio Group of Rockwell International and was first delivered
in March 1974. It is considered here because it is a high-bandwidth
communications processor which can handle 1024 lines simultaneously. It
has been used as a front end to the SABRE 2 airline reservation system.
The C-system's high performance is a result of the architecture
of its hardware and software. A simplified diagram of the C-system is
shown in figure 9.
In the C-System, very little processor power is required to
handle I/O. The overhead due to the state-saving associated with I/O
interrupts is eliminated through the use of very sophisticated I/O
hardware. The C-System I/O hardware operates on a direct memory access
basis. When the C-System I/O hardware has completed its processing of
a buffer, it begins to process the next buffer automatically and with-
out interruption, and places an event notice in an event queue. This
event queue is the means whereby the software running in the C-System
processor is notified of I/O-related events.
The C-System software is organized into tasks which are divided
into priority levels from most to least time-critical. Tasks are switched
only when they are completed or when a timer interrupt occurs. When a
timer interrupt occurs, the state of the current priority level is saved,
and the most time-critical task is initiated. Since timer interrupts
occur relatively seldom, this scheme greatly reduces the overhead due to
task switching.
23
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It is not clear how the C-System could be made secure.
Pluribus . The Pluribus system [5] was produced by Bolt,
Beranek, and Newman Inc. as a high-bandwidth reliable communications
processor for implementing packet switching nodes. It employs a multi-
processor, multi-bus hardware architecture. This multi-processor
architecture provides high bandwidth through the concurrent processing
of tasks. It provides reliability because of the redundancy of components.
A simplified diagram of the Pluribus system hardware is shown in figure 10,
A serious problem,with multi-processor architectures is that
the allocation of tasks to processors and the prevention of interference
between them may introduce so much overhead that much of the potential
advantage of multiple processors is lost. The Pluribus system solution
to this problem is based on a few key ideas.
1. The functions to be performed by the system are broken up
into very short tasks. These tasks are so short that
each can run to completion without preventing the perfor-
mance of time-critical tasks.
2. All of the processors are identical. Thus any free
processor can undertake any task, and the loss of a
processor will result in only a small loss in throughput.
3. The tasks to be processed are kept in an event queue
which is ordered by priority. Each processor consults
the queue every time it completes a task and performs the
highest-priority pending task. Thus the processing
overhead associated with interrupts is eliminated.
4. The event queue is managed by a special hardware device
called the Pseudo Interrupt Device. This device speeds
up queue access and reduces inter-processor interference.
It is not clear how the Pluribus could be made secure.
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Evaluation
Each of the systems described above has some of the characteris-
tics desired for the NFE. But none of the systems has all of these
characteristics. The brief discussion which follows is summarized in
table 1.
Both ANTS I and ELF I were attempts to provide network access
in the shortest possible time. It is remarkable that both were highly
efficient in their use of machine resources and thus satisfactorily
performed the functions that they implemented. But neither system
employed a truly modular structure. And neither was designed with
security in mind.
ANTS II and ELF II were attempts to rectify the lack of
modular design of their respective predecessors. As such, both were
successful. But in both cases this was at the expense of efficiency.
Neither can be considered a high-bandwidth system. And neither was
designed with security in mind.
Network Unix has the modular structure to be expected of a
time-sharing operating system with a device-independent I/O subsystem.
But the process-switching orientation of such systems is ill-suited, and
thus inefficient, for high-bandwidth data communications applications.
The ENFE, which reduces the number of processes through its new IPC
mechanism, is some improvement in this respect. But the improvement is
insufficient to meet the quantitative requirements for the NFE. And
Unix was not designed with security in mind.
Secure Unix should solve the problem of security. But the
replacement of a one-layer operating system with a two-layer one, which
is inherent in the security kernel approach, can only result in lower
effective bandwidth.
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Modularity Efficiency Security
ANTS I - + -
ELF I - + -
ANTS II + - -
ELF II + - -
Network UNIX + - -
ENFE + - -
Secure UNIX + - +
SFEP + 1 +
Pluribus 1 + ?
Collins + -
Table 1
Evaluation of Systems Considered
Key : + Good
Indifferent
Bad
? Not yet determined
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The Honeywell SFEP provides an adequate hardware base for the
production of a secure NFE. If a suitable software architecture is
employed, the SFEP might be able to meet the performance goals for the
NFE. If the Secure Unix approach is taken, there may be some perfor-
mance improvement over the PDP-11 implementation. But it is doubtful
that this improvement will be sufficient to overcome the handicaps of
the security kernel approach.
The Collins C-System and the Pluribus are both capable of
meeting the performance goals for the NFE. The Pluribus approach is
especially attractive because of its high reliability and the ability to
tailor configurations to the required bandwidth. Both of these charac-
teristics are due to the Pluribus' multi-processor architecture. It is
not clear how either system could be made secure.
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Research Directions
The state of the art and its history shows that the production
of an NFE with all of the desired characteristics is a difficult task.
However, the achievements to date suggest directions for research which
can potentially solve the problems involved. In this section we present
some promising ideas for research in hardware and software architecture
relevant to the NFE.
We discuss two alternative hardware architectures. The first
is an inexpensive multi-processor. The second is an efficient CPU which
operates without interrupts.
We then present an alternative architecture for a communications
software system called the Hub System. This system design has some
promise as a base for an NFE which meets all of the requirements.
Alternative Hardware Architectures
Multi-microprocessors with common memory . The advent of
powerful microprocessors combined with the development of high-speed IC
memories suggests that an extremely high-bandwidth communications processor
could be constructed very inexpensively. For example, the Texas Instruments
TMS9900 microprocessor [16] is a single chip 16-bit CPU that has the
same instruction set and highly efficient context switch mechanism as
the TI 990 mini-computer. Typical instruction execution times for the
TMS9900 are on the order of 5 microseconds. IC memories are now available
with cycle times on the order of 50 nanoseconds. Thus the memories are
two orders of magnitude faster than the microprocessors. This suggests
that a large number of microprocessors could access a common memory
without contention and with a fairly simple and inexpensive interface,
producing a system with an extremely high effective processing rate.
This possibility certainly bears further study.
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The Bunch interruptless system . Context saving and restoring
due to interrupts is a major source of overhead in any communications
processor based on traditional hardware architecture. The Collins C-
System and the Pluribus both solve this problem by implementing task
queues in hardware which are interrogated by the CPU(s). Another
solution, proposed by Bunch [2], involves structuring the CPU so that
contexts for a number of processes are supported completely by CPU
hardware. While the CPU still has a single ALU and instruction fetch-
decode-execute mechanism, there is a complete set of registers, including
the program counter, for each high priority process. Each of these
processes is responsible for a hardware I/O management task. The processes
are organized according to a priority system. A "ready bit" is associated
with each priority level. When an I/O device requires attention, it
turns on the ready bit of its assigned priority level. If this priority
level is higher than that of the currently running process, the CPU
switches register sets when the current instruction execution is finished.
This operation should only take a few tens of nanoseconds. When a
process has completed its task, it causes its ready bit to be shut off,
and the CPU switches to the register set of the highest priority process
whose ready bit is set. This scheme permits the use of a process-
switching architecture without its attendant overhead.
An Alternative Software Architecture: The Hub System
The Hub System is a communications software design concept
developed at the University of Illinois Center for Advanced Computation
over the past two years. The Hub System has promise as a way to minimize
the trade-off between efficiency on the one hand and modularity and
security on the other.
The Hub System would implement the reference system as shown
in figure 11. The assignment of reference system functions to Hub System
Modules is as follows:
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Terminal Driver:
Terminal Input ISR
Terminal Output ISR
Terminal Procedure
Virtual Terminal:
Telnet Procedure
Network End-to-End:
NCP Procedure
Network Link:
IMP Procedure
IMP Input ISR
IMP Output ISR
With the exception of the ISR f s, the modules of the Hub System correspond
one-to-one with the functions of the reference system. Furthermore,
only one copy of each module is required even though there may be many
channels. None of the Hub System Modules is implemented as a process;
all are implemented as sets of procedures. All such procedures are
called by one single process - the HUB. This architecture eliminates
the considerable overhead involved in process implementation and process
switching. In this way, the Hub System may be able to meet the performance
requirements for the NFE (e.g., support of 250 terminals).
The elimination of the overhead associated with processes is
made possible by the way in which Hub System Modules communicate with
one another. All communication between Hub System Modules goes through
the Hub Queue. To communicate with another Hub System Module, a given
Hub System Module calls a system procedure. The system procedure enters
a request in the Hub Queue, and then returns. The entry in the Hub
Queue is processed in its turn by the HUB, which calls the appropriate
Hub System Module procedure. This sequence is illustrated in figure 12.
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Every Hub System Module consists of a set of procedures, each
of which corresponds to a type of event, e.g., "dispatch": the generation
of a message to be transmitted. For example, when an event occurs in
the Telnet Hub System Module that is relevant to the NCP Hub System
Module, the Telnet module calls the system procedure corresponding to
the type of event. The system procedure then enters an event notice of
the corresponding type into the Hub Queue. When the HUB removes the
event notice from the Hub Queue, it calls the corresponding procedure
from the set of procedures comprising the NCP module. When that procedure
has completed its processing of the event, it returns control to the
HUB. This sequence is illustrated in figure 13.
The Hub System turns on the HUB. Its operation is that of a
cyclical process:
step n The HUB waits until there is an event notice
in the Hub Queue.
step n+1 The HUB takes the first event notice from
the Hub Queue.
step n+2 The HUB calls the appropriate procedure in
the appropriate Hub System Module.
step n+3 The called procedure performs its task
(which may entail the calling of system
procedures to put new event notices in the
Hub Queue, etc.)*
step n+4 The called procedure returns control to
the HUB.
step n+5 (same as step n, next cycle begins)
.
*
Note that the Hub Queue mechanism implements a recursive
process iteratively.
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The structure of a Hub System Module as a set of procedures
that are invoked one at a time requires that state information be saved
by each procedure between procedure invocations. This information must
be kept separately for each channel using the module. To each channel
using a module there is assigned an area of memory called a Channel
Memory. Thus there is a set of Channel Memories associated with each
Hub System Module. By this means, multiple copies of the same module
are rendered unnecessary. Also associated with each channel using a
module is a set of ports called Channel Ports. These ports are used to
define the route taken by the channel, i.e., the interconnections
between modules. Together, a Channel Memory and its associated Channel
Ports define a Channel Stage. This is illustrated in figure 14.
A Hub System which implements all of the NFE functions is
shown in figure 15.
The Hub System design is efficient. There is no process
switching. The inter-module communication processing overhead is very
small. The tables required to keep track of procedure sets, Channel
Memories, and Channel Ports are small. The Channel Memories themselves
contain only the information necessary for modules to perform their
functions
.
The Hub System design is inherently modular. Inter-module
communication is completely standardized. Modules are necessarily
broken down into procedures which handle well-defined events.
Most important, the Hub System design is securable. All
inter-module communication is performed via system procedures. These
system procedures are so simple that an integrated, verified, single-
level secure system may be practical. The Channel Ports for each stage
define the connections between stages. This provides an efficient
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mechanism for controlling the flow of data between stages. Given an
appropriate hardware base, such as the Honeywell Level 6 with its Security
Protection Module, it may be possible to construct a high-bandwidth
secure NFE using the Hub design.
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Tools for Analysis and Design
A number of basic tools will be needed in the research project
for system analysis and design. These tools fall into two categories:
1. measurement tools, to study the performance of any front end
that is built, and to identify design features needing
improvement; and
2. modeling, to analyze front-end features and design details
before implementation.
In this section we briefly describe the tools of these kinds that will
be useful for studying alternative front-end architectures. We also
indicate how these tools are expected to fit into the overall research
approach.
Measurement Tools
Tools that are needed for studying the performance of an
implemented computer system fall into two categories. First, there is
the software that accumulates and analyzes data on the events which
occur within the system. Second, there is software and/or hardware to
exercise the system in a controlled manner. For a front end, the latter
will consist mainly of message generators.
Much of the event data to be collected will include the time
when the event occurred. A crystal-controlled programmable clock must
be available to provide accurate timings. By time-stamping messages at
various points as they proceed through the system, it is possible to
tell how long messages spend being processed by various modules, waiting
in various queues, etc. It will probably be helpful to be able to
examine complete histories for individual messages, as well as to collect
statistics (means, variances, etc.) on message timings. Probes must be
embedded in the front-end software to attach time-stamps to messages at
appropriate points.
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As an alternative to time-stamping messages, an event trace
mechanism could be built. Such a mechanism allows arbitrary data
relevant to an event (e.g., event type and time of occurrence) to be
stored in an event trace buffer whenever specified events occur. This
data can then be analyzed and/or read out, at the experimenter's con-
venience. Types of events which are of potential interest include:
1. the arrival of a message at a queue,
2. the pickup of a message from a queue,
3. the filling of a buffer or queue, and
4. the breakdown of interprocess communication because of the
lack of message space.
Naturally, the full set of "interesting" events is highly dependent upon
the frontrrend architecture.
A monitoring facility, such as is provided by Unix, will also
be of use. A monitor works by examining the program counter at specified
time intervals. The monitor maintains counts of how often the system is
discovered to be executing the various processes. In this way, a
statistical picture can be built up of how much time the processes are
taking. Since observations made at regular time intervals are not
independent and hence may yield misleading results, it might be advan-
tageous to generate the monitoring interrupts at random intervals.
The message generators to exercise the system must be able to
produce messages of varying lengths and at specified time intervals.
The lengths could be fixed as specified by the experimenter, or they
could be randomized - perhaps normally distributed with a given mean and
variance. Similarly, the time intervals between messages should satisfy
a specified probability distribution (e.g. exponential, if the sending
of messages is assumed to be a Poisson process)
.
42

If various paths through the front end are to be exercised
simultaneously the message generator must have the capability of fanning
out the messages to provide prescribed loadings on the various paths.
In this way it may be possible to study the impact of the different
front-end functions on each other.
The terminal-handling capacity of the front end must also be
determined. If this is to be done by generating an artificial terminal
load, one way to accomplish this is to attach an external computer to
the terminal interface. Software to generate pseudo terminal traffic
would then reside in this external computer.
Finally, testing of the front end in a realistic environment
requires attaching the front end to the host and the network for which
it was designed. Additional software and/or hardware may be required to
implement realistic end-to-end testing.
Modeling
In general, modeling of a system involves the construction of
a formal description of the system - almost always simplified - from
which system behavior may be deduced. In network front ends, certain
parts or .aspects of the system are amenable to study by modeling. For
example, flow control mechanisms or buffering strategies can be modeled
and their impact on throughput examined.
The model - or formal description - is generally couched in
mathematical terms. It could range, depending upon the application,
from a simple algebraic equation to a mathematical construct of con-
siderable complexity and sophistication.
Once one has a model, some technique must be used to extract
from the model the information desired (for example, expected system
throughput) . The building of a model is a process involving a certain
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amount of intuition and judgement, and hence not readily specified in
terms of set rules. Extracting information from the model is, however,
a process subject to straightforward mathematical techniques. In the
remainder of this section we discuss several techniques most likely to
be of use in studying network front ends.
It should be noted that, even though a model is an oversim-
plification of reality and its validity is questionable ja priori , the
predictive ability of a model can be (and should be) checked by com-
parison with experimental results.
Simulation . Computer simulation involves taking a formal
prescription for system behavior and actually mimicking that behavior
in a step-by-step fashion. The problem is that under different condi-
tions (i.e., with different inputs or initial state) the system behaves
differently. Thus many simulations must be carried out and analyzed
statistically to build a complete picture of system behavior.
Nevertheless, simulation has proved itself to be an important
tool in computer system design. In testing a design implementation,
cause and effect can be obscured by the complexity of the system under
observation. A simulation study can help to interpret ambiguous test
results. Simulation can also be useful in fine-tuning a system. It is
often much simpler to try a proposed system change by making the change
in a system simulator than by actually changing the implementation.
General, event-driven simulation systems are readily available,
Such systems are generally flexible enough to allow for both determinis-
tic, scheduled events (e.g., the arrival of a previously dispatched
message) and stochastic events (e.g., the generation of a message by a
process)
.
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The major components of a typical simulation system are an
event generator, a general queue manipulation routine, and a set of
statistical routines. The event generator is the heart of the simula-
tor. Given a list of event names, the associated event distributions
(i.e., probability distributions for occurrences) and initial instances,
this routine generates the corresponding sequences of events. Examples
of events are the arrival and pickup of messages. The events are
generated randomly with the prescribed probability distributions. The
queue manipulation routine handles the addition and deletion of events
from queues, properly maintaining the queue linkages. The statistical
routines gather data on events and compute relevant statistics, as
requested by the user. In addition, there may be a provision for the
user to write his own data analysis routines.
Even though simulation systems of this kind are available,
it would require an enormous amount of additional work to set up a
realistic simulation of an entire network front end. Simulations also
tend to be expensive, having to run for long periods of time to generate
statistically valid results. For these reasons, it is unlikely that
full-scale simulations of front-end behavior can be carried out.
Simulations of selected features of the front end (such as flow control
mechanisms or buffer allocation strategies) may, however, help to identify
places where changes in the front-end design could lead to performance
improvement.
Markov process analysis . The main disadvantage of simulations -
namely, the long run times required to generate valid statistics - can
sometimes be avoided. One way to do this is to model the behavior of
interest as a Markov process, mathematically describable as a large set
of linear, algebraic equations, which may then be solved by computer.
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The first step in building a Markov model is to define a set
of states describing the subsystem to be modeled. The system moves from
state to state as time passes. A transition matrix T can then be defined
with elements T giving the probability of a transition from state j to
state i in time t. These first steps are not as difficult as they might
appear. Something like a simulation program may be used to automatically
determine successive possible states and to keep track of the transition
probabilities.
The matrix T can then be used to obtain steady-state popula-
tion densities, or probabilities that the system is in a given state.
Suppose that p is a column vector whose components p . are the probabil-
ities that the system is in state j. Then the steady-state probabilities
must satisfy
Tp = p.
This homogeneous system of linear, algebraic equations may be solved for
p by one of the numerical techniques available for large, sparse matrices.
The problem is that, for a system of any complexity, the
number of states, and hence the matrix T, is enormous. We have used a
Markov model to study a simple flow-control scheme and found several
hundred states necessary. To specify a state for flow-control purposes
requires specifying the number of full (or empty) buffers at each end
and the locations (necessarily discretized) of all messages and acknow-
ledgements in the system. Nevertheless, we found that our Markov model
readily yielded results on throughput and buffer utilization. (For
example, if states 1 and 2 are the only ones for which all send buffers
are full, then p. + p~ gives the fraction of the time that all send
buffers are expected to be full.) In more complicated cases, not only
will the computation become very time-consuming, but also it may be
difficult to interpret the huge array of population densities obtained.
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One could, however, build and use Markov models for a thorough study
of proposed flow control mechanisms both within the front end and between
host and front end. Buffer management can also be studied by Markov
models. Like simulation, Markov analysis could also be very helpful in
fine-tuning these aspects of the system. Unfortunately, the proliferation
of states with system complexity makes it unlikely that this tool will
be useful on a broad scale.
Queueing theory . Queueing theory is the study of waiting
lines for a service, or set of services. Jobs are assumed to enter the
system and to join a queue for service. After moving to the head of the
queue, they are processed and either leave the system or join the queue
for another service. Some simple queueing systems may be analyzed as
Markov processes. For example, in a single-queue, single-service system,
the system states are defined by a single variable: the number of jobs
in the queue. The transition matrix then tends to be very simple and
solvable by analytic means.
Queueing theory is a natural way to determine buffer needs at
the various points in a front end. Consider, for example, the set of
buffers belonging to any particular module. Assume for simplicity that
there is no flow control. Suppose that we can measure or estimate the
rate of arrival of messages to be processed and the time it then takes
to process each message. Queueing theory will immediately yield the
probabilities p that there are n messages waiting to be processed. We
n
would then choose the number N of buffers to be large enough so that
n>N
n
is very small ( so that the buffers seldom overflow) . Flow control
will, of course, prevent buffer overflow. But the queueing theory
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analysis is still useful, since if message arrivals must be slowed
because of a shortage of buffers, system throughput will decrease.
It is likely that the more complex aspects of a front end will
not be amenable to queueing theory analysis. However, queueing theory
may be successfully used to model the simpler aspects of front-end
behavior.
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Research Plan
Overview
The Alternative Architecture Research Plan will lead to the
specification of an NFE which will meet WWMCCS needs through the 1980 's.
Figure 16 is a diagram of the complete research plan. The research plan
consists of four phases:
1) the preparation phase,
2) the research phase,
3) the prototype phase, and
4) the specification phase.
Each of these phases is further divided into stages.
Preparation phase . The preparation phase will produce a set
of technical constraints for the design of the WWMCCS NFE and will
select a set of design features to be studied in the research phase.
The preparation phase will use:
1) the existing knowledge of WWMCCS user requirements [18,19,20,21,
22,23,24],
2) the Experimental Network Front End (see p. 19),
3) • the literature on computer architecture, and
4) the analytical tools described in the preceding section.
Research phase . The research phase will use the technical con-
straints and selected design features from the preparation phase to
construct a Research NFE (RNFE) which will serve as a test bed for arch-
itectural concepts. Each design feature will be implemented and tested,
insofar as is possible, in isolation. The design features which are
most promising and which at the same time comprise a complete, compatible,
NFE system design will then become the RNFE. The resulting RNFE may
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then undergo several iterations of a cycle consisting of redesign, con-
struction, and evaluation. After each iteration, a decision point will
determine whether to:
1) iterate again,
2) proceed, or
3) terminate the program.
When sufficient confidence in the RNFE has been gained, the RNFE will
be evaluated in a network environment. Another decision point will
determine whether to iterate as above or to proceed into the prototype
phase. The prototype phase will use the set of technical constraints
produced in the preparation phase, and the knowledge gained in the
research phase, to design and implement a Prototype NFE (PNFE) . An
iterative cycle similar to that employed for the RNFE will be employed
for the PNFE.
Specification phase . In the specification phase, the PNFE
and the set of technical constraints will become the basis for the
WWMCCS NFE specification.
There follows a detailed description of each of the phases of
the research plan.
Preparation Phase
The preparation phase (see figure 17) will lay the groundwork
for the rest of the project. It has two major goals:
1) to identify the technical constraints on the design
of the NFE system, and
2) to select design features appropriate for investigation
in the research phase.
The technical constraints will serve both as a basis for selecting design
features in the preparation phase and as a basis for evaluating progress
51
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in the other phases of the project. The design features will be in-
vestigated further in the research phase for possible incorporation in
the Research NFE.
In the preparation phase the primary tool will be mathematical
modeling. This will allow many design features to be evaluated relatively
economically.
The preparation phase has six stages:
1) the study stage,
2) the load estimation stage,
3) the constraint determination stage,
4) the gross specification stage,
5) the screening stage, and
6) the comparison stage.
Each of these stages is described below.
Study stage . The study stage will establish a data base which
will influence every phase of the project. The data will be drawn
from three sources:
1) the existing studies of WWMCCS user requirements,
2) the ENFE experiments (see [17]), and
3) the relevant published literature.
The existing studies of WWMCCS user requirements will be used
to develop two sets of WWMCCS NFE characteristics. They will be
instrumental in determining the technical constraints on the NFE design.
The first set of WWMCCS NFE characteristics consists of the load mix of
applications and users which must be supported on the WWMCCS network
under both normal and unusual conditions. The load mix will be used in
the load estimation stage. The second set of WWMCCS NFE characteristics
consists of system characteristics such as availability, response time,
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security, and flexibility. This second set of characteristics will
be used in the constraint determination stage.
The ENFE experiments will be used to develop two sets of
measurements. They will be used in determining the technical constraints
on the NFE design. The first of these two sets of measurements consists
of internal measurements of the ENFE. These internal measurements will
facilitate both understanding the system bottlenecks inherent in the
architecture of the ENFE and also identifying the resources required in
the NFE regardless of its architecture. The internal measurements will
be used in the constraint determination stage. The second of the two
sets of measurements consists of measurements of the load placed on the
ENFE by known applications running in the WWMCCS H6000 under known
conditions. This set of load measurements, expressed as statistical
distributions of message sizes and message inter-arrival times, will
be used in the load estimation stage.
The literature on computer hardware and software architecture,
communication processor design, computer security and protection, and
other relevant topics will be searched to determine the state of the
art in existing designs related to NFE problems. Proposed but untested
designs will also be sought out. The information obtained through this
literature search will be used in the gross specification stage and in
the screening stage.
Load estimation stage . The load estimation stage will produce
estimates of the traffic load on the NFE under both normal and unusual
conditions. The estimates of traffic load, expressed as statistical
distributions, will be used in the constraint determination stage.
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A mathematical model, the load model, will be constructed
using information produced in the study stage:
1) the load mix derived from the WWMCCS user requirements, and
2) the load measurements obtained from the ENFE experiments.
The load model will be used to obtain estimates of the traffic load
distribution. The values assigned to parameters of the model will be
varied to obtain estimates of the traffic load on the NFE under normal
conditions and also under unusual conditions. Unusual conditions include
both crisis situations and loss of computing or communication resources.
As an example, let us assume that the load mix shows that a
particular NFE in the WWMCCS system will normally have 100 active
terminal users, 75 using application A on the local host and 25 using
application B on a remote host. The ENFE load measurements for each of
applications A and B will be consulted. The load mix and the load
measurements will then be used to generate parameter values for simulations
which yield a measure, in bits per second and messages per second, of
the traffic load on the NFE under these normal conditions.
Now let us assume that the foreign host, which normally supports
application B, becomes inaccessible. Let us further assume that, under
these conditions, the local host must support application B as well as
application A, and that there are 100 remote users of application B.
This information will be used to generate new parameter values for simula-
tions which yield a measure of the traffic load on the NFE under these
unusual conditions.
Constraint determination stage . The constraint determination
stage will produce a set of technical constraints. The NFE design will
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have to meet these constraints if it is to fulfill the WWMCCS user require-
ments. The technical constraints will be used in two stages of the prepar-
ation phase: the gross specification stage and the comparison stage. The
technical constraints will also be used in the other phases of the project.
A mathematical model, the constraint model, will be constructed
using the information produced in previous stages:
1) the system characteristics developed in the study stage
from the WWMCCS user requirements,
2) the internal measurements obtained in the study stage
from the ENFE experiments, and
3) the estimated traffic load distribution produced in the
load estimation stage.
Some of the constraints will come directly from the WWMCCS user require-
ments. They will be expressed in quantities such as:
1) minimum percent system availability,
2) maximum response time,
3) maximum probability of security violation, and
4) maximum cost of system modification.
Other constraints will come from more sophisticated analysis, using
techniques such as simulation. These constraints will be expressed
in quantities such as:
1) minimum required buffer space,
2) minimum throughput in messages per second, and
3) maximum processing time per character.
Gross specification stage . The gross specification stage will
produce a set of gross specifications for the NFE design. These gross
specifications will be used in the screening stage as the criteria for
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selecting design features for closer examination. The gross specifications
will be produced through system analysis using:
1) the technical constraints developed in the constraint
determination stage, and
2) the state of the art in hardware and software design
as discovered by the literature search performed in the study
stage.
The relation between this information and the gross specifications
may be clarified by the following examples.
1) The system availability constraint may lead, in
the present state of the art, to the specification
of an NFE system with redundant hardware; i.e., multiple
processors, busses, memories, etc.
2) The minimum buffer space constraint may be used to
specify the minimum amount of memory which the NFE system
must be able to support and address.
3) The security constraint may lead to a specification
of the functional characteristics of the memory pro-
tection hardware for the NFE system.
4) The throughput and security constraints may lead to
the specification that certain operating system functions
be implemented in hardware or firmware.
Screening stage . The screening stage will select hardware
and software designs which are to be compared in the comparison stage.
The designs to be considered will be those identified by the literature
search in the study stage. Both existing designs and proposed designs
will be examined. The selection will be based upon the compatibility of
each design with the gross specifications. For instance:
*7

1) An operating system design might be rejected
because it cannot support multiple processor
configurations
.
2) A mainframe design might be rejected because it
makes memory protection difficult.
Comparison stage . The comparison stage will compare the
designs selected by the screening stage. Using mathematical modeling,
the comparison will determine the designs which best meet the technical
requirements. The designs which, under the analysis, best solve the
problems posed by the constraints will be selected for empirical examination
in the research phase.
Research Phase
The research phase (see figure 18) will evaluate design
features by implementing them and then performing experiments using the
implementations. This approach is empirical, as distinguished from the
modeling approach used in the preparation phase. The outcome of the
experiments will be the Research NFE (RNFE) , which will have been tested
in actual network use. The RNFE will serve in the prototype phase as a
basis for the design of the Prototype NFE.
The research phase will use both the technical constraints and
the selected design features produced in the preparation phase. It will
produce both the RNFE and the RNFE Experiment Plan which will be used in
the prototype phase.
The research phase will consist of three stages:
1) the isolated experiment stage,
2) the integrated experiment stage, and
3) the network experiment stage.
Each of these stages is described below.
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Isolated experiment stage . The isolated experiment stage
will further refine, vis-a-vis the technical constraints, the evaluation
of each of the design features selected in the preparation phase. This
evaluation will require, for each design feature:
1) implementing it to a point sufficient for experimentation, and
2) evaluating it via experiment.
The evaluation of the design features will not require the implementation
of an entire system for each design feature. The outcome of the isolated
experiment stage will be a set of usable design features which will be
employed in the integrated experiment stage.
Integrated experiment stage . The integrated experiment stage
will select a set of design features which can be used in designing a
preliminary RNFE. These usable design features will be mutually compatible
and will comprise a complete design for a basic communication processing
system. The preliminary RNFE will contain a set of software and hardware
modules sufficient for evaluating the integrated design. The preliminary
RNFE need not contain the complicated hardware and software modules
required for network access. This restriction may permit a relatively
economical evaluation of the preliminary RNFE as a communications pro-
cessor. A plan, the RNFE Experiment Plan, will be developed for testing
and evaluating the RNFE.
The integrated experiment stage will use the technical con-
straints developed in the preparation phase both to guide the design
of the preliminary RNFE and to serve as a basis for the design of the
RNFE Experiment Plan.
The integrated experiment stage will employ a cyclic process
of design, construction, and evaluation. The evaluation will proceed
according to the RNFE Experiment Plan. After each cycle, a decision
will be taken as to whether to:
60

1) redesign part or all of the RNFE,
2) reimplement part or all of the RNFE,
3) go on to the network experiment stage, or
4) terminate the program.
Network experiment stage . The network experiment stage will
be entered when a preliminary RNFE has passed evaluation. In this
stage, hardware and software will be constructed for connecting the RNFE
to an existing network which mimics the expected WWMCCS network environ-
ment. The resulting RNFE will then be subjected to a rigorous test and
evaluation under realistic conditions. The evaluation will proceed
according to the RNFE Experiment Plan. A cyclic process will again
be employed; at the end of each cycle, it will be decided whether to:
1) return to some point in the integrated experiment stage,
2) go on to the prototype phase, or
3) terminate the program.
Prototype Phase
The prototype phase (see figure 19) will construct a prototype
NFE (PNFE), using the architectural knowledge gained in the research
phase. The PNFE will serve as the basis for the specification of the
WWMCCS NFE. A plan, the PNFE Experiment Plan, will be developed for
testing and evaluating the PNFE.
The prototype phase will use the technical constraints
developed in the preparation phase, and the RNFE developed in the
research phase, to guide the design of the PNFE. The experience gained
in designing and using the RNFE Experiment Plan will be used in designing
the PNFE Experiment Plan.
The PNFE will be a complete WWMCCS NFE employing state-of-the-art
technology. It will contain all of the hardware and software necessary
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for connecting WWMCCS hosts to the networks and devices used in the
WWMCCS environment.
The completed PNFE will be subjected to a cyclic test and
evaluation process using the PNFE Experiment Plan. At the end of each
cycle it will be decided whether to:
1) redesign the PNFE,
2) alter the implementation of the PNFE,
3) go on to the specification phase, or
4) terminate the program.
Specification Phase
The specification phase (see figure 20) will produce the
specification for the WWMCCS NFE.
The specification phase will base the specification on:
1) the technical constraints developed in the preparation
phase, and
2) the PNFE developed in the prototype phase.
63

e
o
•H
4-1
01 «J
•U a
•H •H
U (4-13 •H
u
at
a
CO
B
c
o
o
<4-l
c
l-l
I
I
I
01
CQ
«J
c
o
03
CJ
o
0)
a
CO
o
CN
0»
u
3
00
aseqd adiC^o^ojd uiojj asBqd uoj^Bjedaad uiojj
64

References
1. Bouknight, W.J., Grossman, G.R., and Grothe, D.M. "A New Approach
to Network Access Computer System Design", Proceedings of Interface:
Third Data Communications Symposium, 1973.
2. Bunch, S.R. Personal communication, 1975.
3. Chesson, G.L. "The Network Unix System", Proceedings of the 5th
Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, 1975, ACM, New York,
1975, pp. 60-66.
4. Gasser, M. and Biba, K.J. Secure Communications Processor
Specification , Working Paper No. 20774, The MITRE Corporation,
Bedford, MA, 1976.
5. Heart, F.E., et al. "A New Minicomputer/Multiprocessor for the
ARPA Network", AFIPS Conference Proceedings Vol. 42, NCC, 1973.
6. Holmgren, S.F. "The Network Unix System", CAC Document No. 155,
University of Illinois, Center for Advanced Computation, Urbana,
IL, 1975.
7. Holmgren, S.F., et al. Experimental Network Front End Functional
Description
, CAC Document No. 221, CCTC-WAD Document No. 7502,
Center for Advanced Computation, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Urbana, IL, 1977.
8. Retz, D. "ELF - A System for Network Access", 1975 IEEE Intercon
Conference Record (New York, April 8-10, 1975), Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., NY, 1975, pp. 25-2-1
—
25-2-5.
9. Retz, D. , et al. ELF System Programmer's Guide , Speech Communications
Research Laobratory Inc., Santa Barbara, CA, September, 1974.
10. Thompson, K. and Ritchie, D.M. "The Unix Time-Sharing System",
Communications ACM 17, July 1974, pp. 365-375.
11. Popek, G.J. and Kline, C.S., "The PDP-11 Virtual Machine Architecture:
A Case Study", Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Operating
System Principles, 1975, ACM, NY, 1975, pp. 97-105.
12. Popek, G.J. and Kline, C.S. "A Verifiable Protection System",
Proceedings of the ACM International Conference on Reliable Software,
ACM, NY, 1975, pp. 294-304.
13. Schiller, W. Design of a Security Kernel for the PDP-11/45 , Air
Force Electronic Systems Division, ESD-TR-73-294, Dec. 1973.
14. Honeywell Level 6 Minicomputer Handbook , Order No. AS22, Honeywell
Information Systems, Inc., Waltham, MA, 1976.
65

15. Network Front End Development Plan , CCTC-WAD, Reston, VA, September,
1976.
16. 990 Computer Family Systems Handbook , Manual No. 945250-9701,
Texas Instruments Inc. , Austin, Texas, 1975.
17. Belford, G. , and Putnam, D. Experimental Network Front End
Experiment Plan
,
CAC Document No. 227, CCTC-WAD Document No. 7509,
Center for Advanced Computation, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Urbana, IL, 1977.
18. WWMCCS ADP Communication Interface Requirements , RAND Report
No. WN-9418, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1976.
19. WWMCCS /AUTODIN : Selection of a Communications Executive , RAND
Report No. WN-9267, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1975.
20. WWMCCS Communications Interface Subsystem Alternatives , RAND
Report No. WN-9590, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1976.
21. WWMCCS Communications Interface Subsystem (WCIS ) Requirements
Specification , RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1977.
22. WWMCCS Communications Interface Subsystem (WCIS ) - Solution
Alternatives , RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1977.
23. WWMCCS Data Management System Operational Requirements , RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1977.
24. A Preliminary Analysis of DBM Concept for WWMCCS ADP , SDC Report
No. 607, System Development Corporation, Santa MOnica, CA, 1976.
66

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whmn Dmtm Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Tr*fSS?VmM&it Number 232
CCTC-WAD Document Number 7512
2. GOVT ACCESSION NO
READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
I. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (end Submit)
Network Research in Front Ending and Intelligent
Terminals - Alternative Architecture Research
Plan
I. TYRE OF RERORT * RERIOO COVERED
Research
«. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
CAC #232
7. AUTHORS
Gary R. Grossman
Richard H. Howe
Geneva G. Belford
S. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf*)
DCA100-76-C-0088
9. PERFORMING.ORGAN1ZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Center for Advanced Computation
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, Illinois 61801
«0. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA * WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS
Command and Control Technical Center
WWMCCS ADP Directorate
11440 Isaac Newton Sq.. N.
Reston, Virginia 22090
12. REPORT DATE
September 30, 1977
13. NUMBER OF PAGES
70
(4. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADORESSfi/ dlltermnt from Controlling Office) 13. SECURITY CLASS, (of thie rmport)
UNCLASSIFIED
Mm. DECLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol thle Report)
Copies may be requested from the address given in (11) above.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol the mbstrmct entered In Block 20, II dllfmrmnt from Report)
No restriction on distribution.
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
None
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reveree elde II neceeemry end Identity by block number)
Network front end
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reveree elde II neceeeery end identity by block number)
The CAC is engaged in an investigation of the benefits to be gained by
employing a network front end. Currently a DEC PDP-11/70 is being used as
front end for connecting a Honeywell 6000 host to the ARPANET. This document
presents a five-year plan for a comprehensive study of alternative archi-
tectures, with the ultimate goal of producing specifications for a front
end that will meet the long-term needs of the Defense Communications Agency.
dd,:FORMAN 73 1473 EDITION OF I NOV «S IS OBSOLETE UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Dmtm Entered)



